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Introduction1
some ideas are elusive. luxury is a case in point. It is indicative 
of its elusiveness that, historically speaking, its effective 
meaning has not remained constant. To read, for example, the 
Roman historian sallust (1971) on the insidious danger of luxury 
alongside the celebratory enticements to stay in a luxury hotel 
is to be presented with two very different sets of assumptions. 
This difference can be informatively illuminated by observing 
how the meaning of “luxury” has changed from being a morally 
charged threat to virtue to being a morally acceptable synonym 
for material well-being and enjoyment, like a stay in The Ritz. 
From the Greeks through to the Romans (especially) and 
on into Christianity and the Renaissance, luxury belongs 
in a generically moralised vocabulary. Cicero (1913, I.30) 
conveniently summarises the context. He juxtaposed a frugal 
life of temperance, sobriety and austerity that is worthy or 
honestum with a life of luxury and softness that is corrupt or 
turpe. Frugality, poverty and the like were virtues that embodied 
the conduct of a “natural life” — a life kata phusin or secundum 
naturam. elsewhere, Cicero (1927, V.35) declares it to be 
self-evident that nature’s requirements are few and inexpensive. 
The “natural life” is the “simple” or Christian ascetic life, where 
meeting the needs for food, shelter and clothing is easy because 
they are finite or possess a “natural limit” (i.e. “eat to live”). 
Those who live simply will not be poor because they are not “in 
need”. Conversely, it is only those who have exceeded nature’s 
bounds who feel “poor” and that is because they desire more 
(i.e. “live to eat”). once the natural limit is passed then there 
is no resting place since the “unnatural” has no terminus (see 
seneca, 1932, #16).
Desires in general and those for luxuries a fortiori were judged 
a threat on both an individual and social level. Regarding the 
former, there is a somatic focus. This has remained and it is a 
central part of the history of luxury that from being negative this 
focus has become a positive. on the classical view, the definitive 
characteristic of desires that focus on the body is that they are 
boundless. For example, seneca (1932, #119) disparages the 
enjoyment of fine food. To give one of his examples, bread made 
from inferior flour assuages hunger as effectively as that baked 
from better quality ingredients; the purpose of food is to fill the 
stomach, not indulge it. From this perspective, what the desire 
for luxuries amounted to was investing inappropriate value in 
bodily satisfactions. An informative illustration comes from the 
late stoic philosopher, epictetus. He is recorded as saying that 
the purpose of footwear is to protect feet. once that appropriate 
or “natural” measure of needfulness is forsaken, then there are 
no limits and, as a result, there is nothing inappropriate about 
successively desiring a gilded, a purple, and an embroidered 
slipper (epictetus, 1932, §39). It was this limitlessness associated 
with ‘desire’ that made it so threatening and, as this example 
intimates, these gilded slippers are unneeded luxury items. 
Viewed from that perspective, life will always appear too 
short. Those who see matters in this light will become “soft 
through a life of luxury” and accordingly afraid of death (seneca, 
1932, #78). such fear is unmanly and illustrates a long-running 
association of luxury and softness and effeminacy. Pointedly, 
men who live a life of luxury become effeminate. That is to say 
they become “soft” and fickle like women, unable to endure 
hardship and act steadfastly in a virile “manly” fashion, where 
that means acting in the public arena, including risking death 
and acting courageously. It is not mere coincidence that in 
both Greek and latin the words for “man” have the same root 
as those for “courage”. such a life has social consequences. A 
society where luxury is established will devote itself to private, 
self-regarding ends and men will be unwilling to act for the 
public good or fight for their patria. This society, it follows, will 
be militarily weak — a nation of cowards will easily collapse.
A further implication of this weakness was that the desire 
for luxuries or the valorising of bodily satisfactions corrupted 
the proper means to provide the basic needs of a natural life. 
According to Aristotle, the proper locus to provide for those 
needs was the “household” (oikos), which is to be understood 
as an “estate”, not the dwelling of a nuclear family. The task 
or function of the household was to meet limited needs. This 
responsibility may, within limits, go beyond the immediate 
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confines of the estate. Accordingly, olives may be exchanged 
for some honey, as long as — and these are the limits — the 
recipient uses the olives for their proper or natural purpose, that 
is, consumes them. But this process of exchange (“economics”) 
remains an instrumental task subordinate to the intrinsically 
worthwhile activities that constitute the “good life” of “politics”, 
that is, engagement in matters of general or public concern. 
If the merely instrumental became instead an end, then 
that was an unnatural perversion. From this it followed that 
“economics” was embedded in a moralised context; it had its 
proper (subordinate) place. This moralisation ultimately rested 
on a conception of a worthwhile human (male) life of freedom 
that is debased if it is spent slavishly pursuing merely necessary 
(unfree) existential ends.
A significant consequence of this moralised hierarchy was that 
traders or merchants, that is, those who engaged in exchange 
for a living, lived less than fully human lives. These individuals 
were thus disparaged. According to Aristotle, for example, in 
the best “state” (polis) those who live a “mercantile life” will 
not be citizens because such a life is ignoble and inimical to 
virtue (Aristotle, 1944, 1328b40-41).2 It was not that men could 
not adopt the commercial life, but that such a life was unworthy; 
it was akin, as seneca and others had observed, to the inferior 
preoccupation with mere living that was the object of animals, 
slaves and women. Women, moreover, being weak or soft, 
craved the delights of luxurious living. For example, according 
to livy (1919, bk. 34 §§2-4) Cato described women as having 
“uncontrollable natures” because they wanted to repeal the 
Lex Orchia, 215 BCe, one of the many Roman sumptuary laws. 
This particular piece of legislation, inter alia, limited the amount 
of gold women could possess, forbad them from wearing a 
coloured cloak and riding in a carriage inside the city. similar 
(misogynistic) sentiments were expressed in early Christian 
thought.3
These adornments, along with opulent furnishings, exotic 
foodstuffs and other goods deemed luxuries by critics were, of 
course, not supplied by the home estates, but by merchants. 
This reinforced the judgment that merchants were not merely 
superfluous, but also potentially corrupting intermediaries. The 
need-determined exchange of olive and honey was indeed 
“natural”, but traders or merchants functioned to furnish and 
fuel self-regarding desires, especially for goods to satisfy bodily 
satisfactions (like embroidered slippers) and their motive for 
doing so was to enrich themselves. And given the normative 
hierarchy of ends over means, the actions and motives of 
merchants were morally suspect. merchants are motivated by 
their private interests, whereas a citizen in the full sense, that is, 
the independent male head of the household, dedicated his life 
to the common interest or public good. 
In sum, luxury constituted a moral threat; it undermined for 
both individuals and their societies the virtues that come from 
living where the values of the good life obtain. The negation 
of this moralised context for luxury centrally concerned a 
revaluation of the place of desire and the role played by 
commerce.
Berry (1984, ch. 5) has called this negation “de-moralization”. 
This is a gradual and uneven process. Among the many 
contributing factors is the impact of Galilean science. This not 
only overturned Aristotelian physics, it also contributed to 
the overturning of Aristotelian teleological ethics; the focus is 
increasingly on “how” things happen, not “why”. Isaac Newton 
did not know what gravity was, but it was sufficient that it could 
be measured, and its operation was law-like. similarly, why 
pleasure pleases is unknown, but it is sufficient to know that 
humans like it and their actions are, in consequence, predictable.
What this shift represented was a different reading of human 
nature. It was this which underwrote the emergence of positive 
assessments of luxury by establishing the philosophical basis for 
its demoralisation. The crux was the identification of a regularity 
or constancy in human motivation that is rooted in the passions, 
in desire and aversion. It is a predictable constant that all humans 
move toward whatever pleases them and away from whatever 
pains them. From which followed a new moral assessment: 
pleasure is good; pain is bad. The corollary to the universality of 
passionate motivation is that reason plays an instrumental role; 
it calculates the best (most efficient) way to bring about what 
is desired (Hobbes, 1991, ch. 5). This is a reversal of the classical 
account which saw reason in the role of commander and the 
bodily passions as subservient. And since on that account to 
enjoy luxury was to be enslaved by desires then this reversal 
now permits a re-evaluation of luxury, as a source of pleasure 
and an incentive to produce the goods to make life better. 
Rather than provide a survey of this shift, I will seek to capture 
it by outlining the argument of David Hume in his essay “of 
Refinement of Arts”, which on its first appearance in 1752 was 
entitled “of luxury”. This essay stands historically at a key point. 
It builds on or assumes the “new” account of human motivation 
with its defence of pleasure and critique of austere virtue as 
well as the defence of commerce, an affirmation (pace Aristotle) 
of the “noble vocation” of a merchant (mun, [1664] 1928, p. 3) 
together with an associated rehabilitation of desire undertaken 
by theorists of trade, culminating in Bernard mandeville’s 
notorious Fable of the Bees (1988). Hume, in other words, is less 
an innovator than a brilliant exponent of the shift. on the other 
hand, to the same effect, after Hume (which is not to say because 
of Hume), the shift has largely been completed. of course, 
there are no sharp edges in these matters. There were always 
moralists about like Henry Thoreau who, in Walden ([1854] 
2012, p. 12), judged most luxuries to be “positive hindrances to 
the elevation of mankind”, and in the late nineteenth century 
there was a flurry of publications worried about “luxury” and 
the development of mass consumption. moreover, it is possible 
that some late twentieth and twenty-first century attacks on 
consumerism can be interpreted in a similar light. 
one indication of Hume’s historically sensitive situation is 
his own self-consciousness. He opens his essay by stating that 
“luxury” is a word of “uncertain signification” (1987, p. 268). He 
knows full well the position of those “severe moralists’ (as he 
calls them — sallust is named as an example) that “luxury” is a 
vice, and he also knows that mandeville has attacked this line 
and that it had been taken up more soberly by contemporaries 
like Jean-François melon (1734). Against this background, Hume 
gives his own definition: luxury is “great refinement in the 
gratification of senses” (Hume, 1987, p. 268). Any thought that 
this is intended to be read censoriously as an endorsement of 
the moralists is displaced by his generalising remark that “ages 
of refinement” are “both the happiest and most virtuous” (1987, 
p. 269). In a clear break from the moralist tradition, therefore, 
Hume is coupling luxury/refinement with happiness/virtue, not 
opposing them.
For Hume, happiness comprises repose, pleasure and action 
(1987, pp. 269-270). of these, the last is given most weight, but 
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it is the twist that Hume gives to it that is crucial. The focus is 
not the Ciceronic negotium, with its preoccupation with public 
or political affairs, but the private endeavour of industry. Where 
industry abounds, then individuals will be not only opulent, but 
happy as its members “reap the benefit of…commodities so far 
as they gratify the senses and appetite” (Hume, 1987, p. 263). 
If we ask what motivates them, Hume answers “avarice and 
industry, art and luxury” (ibid.). since “avarice” was uniformly 
condemned by the severe moralists, then this statement alone 
effectively signals the switch in evaluations that has occurred. 
We can pursue what was involved in that switch by picking up 
on a further remark of Hume’s. As a ratchet effect, humans, when 
presented with luxury goods, are roused to activity or industry 
by a “desire of a more splendid way of life than what their 
ancestors enjoyed” (Hume, 1987, p. 264). Contrary to epictetus, 
that desire feeds on desire is now an accurate description of 
what is natural, of the way the human world works. 
The shift away from moralism that Hume’s account exemplifies 
means that luxury can be understood as the opposite of 
necessity. once demoralised, a life of necessity now signifies 
not the austere life of poverty, but an impoverished one, a life 
of misery. There is nothing ennobling or redemptive about this 
poverty. As Adam smith put it in the Introduction to the Wealth 
of Nations ([1776] 1981), those who are “miserably poor” are “
frequently reduced or, at least, think themselves reduced, to 
the necessity sometimes of directly destroying and sometimes 
abandoning their infants, their old people and those afflicted 
with lingering diseases, to perish with hunger or to be devoured 
by wild beasts (1981, p. 10). 
While in a “civilized and thriving country”, “universal 
opulence” extends itself to the “lowest rank of people” (smith 
1981, p. 22), who are able to enjoy “luxury” in their “way of living” 
(smith, 1982, p. 489). once luxury is seen in this light, then its 
development into the lexicon of “ad speak” can be understood. 
“luxury” can, without hesitation, be tacked on adjectivally to 
almost any article of merchandise from pizzas to handbags, from 
a fountain pen to an apartment and to hotels. The adjective 
is attached presumably to make the “good” more desirable 
and thus more likely to be bought. of course, no one needs a 
pair of embroidered slippers, the decorativeness of which is 
superfluous. But from the demoralised perspective, embroidered 
slippers are more pleasing than plain ones, and where is the 
harm in that pleasure? moreover, think of all the extra industry 
generated and employment created by the desire to have those 
exquisitely produced slippers and think, too, of the economic 
benefits that will flow from my desire next year to own an even 
more fashionable and luxurious pair.
The dynamism of desire in this way fuels the engine of modern 
economies. one way of depicting this dynamism is to chart 
the seemingly never-ceasing transformation of luxuries into 
necessities. This transformation demonstrates that, whereas in 
the world of seneca and others, luxury (bad) and poverty (good) 
stood as categorically opposed ways of life, in the modern 
world, luxury is only contingently contrasted with necessity; 
they are points on a single scale or continuum. There is a further 
dimension to this dynamism. since any alteration to epictetus’ 
functional slipper is unwarranted then there is seemingly no 
place for change or innovation. one of the striking things about 
the classical critique of luxury was that very often in practice it 
aimed to sustain a hierarchical status quo.
The prevalence of sumptuary legislation from the Romans 
through to the eighteenth century in some societies bears this 
out. A central concern in these laws was to preserve the pecking 
order, to attempt through display to maintain “distance” 
(Bourdieu, 1979, p. 58), and thus to confine the incidence of a 
good and prevent its diffusion. luxury, “new” wealth, always 
threatened to overturn this. Those in the lower ranks of these 
societies may well have wanted some of those privileged goods, 
but that “wanting” was a mark of their unworthiness, since 
they desired them for their own personal use. The decline of 
sumptuary laws is a marker not necessarily of greater economic 
equality, but of the wish of individuals (consumers) to be free 
according to their own preferences, to get delight and pleasure 
from attractive clothes, delicious meals, comfortable homes and 
enjoyable holidays. And that wish itself signals the recognition 
that the desire on the part of the “have-nots” to those goods 
currently possessed by the “haves” is legitimate. This morally 
endorsed combination was captured by smith (1982, p. 185) in 
his Glasgow lectures when he professed that the “opulence and 
freedom” were the “two greatest blessings men can possess”.
Contemporary luxury is just a particular subset of adjectives. 
Clothing, food, accommodation and leisure remain the basic 
categories of desired goods (Berry, 1984, ch. 1). A Dior dress, 
a michelin-star meal, a 5th Avenue penthouse and a stay at The 
Ritz are each qualitative refinements of those four categories 
of commonly shared desires. From this, it is easy to appreciate 
what a five-star hotel will seek to offer — space, high-quality 
toiletries and bathrobes, excellent service, a spa, a gym, its own 
michelin-starred restaurant and so on, all alongside the provision 
of an experience to be treasured. In sum, as the acme of luxury, 
it pampers the body and provides well-being.
Note
1. This article draws on Berry (1995; 1999; 2005).
2. similar sentiments can be found in Plato and Xenophon, while among 
Roman authors, Cicero (1913, 1, §150) for example, judged merchants 
to be engaged in a sordid or demeaning activity; indeed, they have 
to tell lies to make a living.
3. see the fulminations of Clement of Alexandria (1891, pp. 439-440) 
and Tertullian (1869, p. 331), who strikingly refer to female luxury as 
effeminising the manliness of faith (fidei virtus effeminari). The role of 
eve, as first manifesting weakness by succumbing to the wiles of the 
serpent and then exhibiting guile to get Adam to eat the forbidden 
fruit, added another dimension to this misogyny. From the Christian 
fathers to the middle Ages, “luxury” was conterminous with “lust”.
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